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POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: FOURTH AMENDMENT
LIMITS ON THE USE OF MOLECULAR SCANNERS
Paul Wolfgramm Jr.*
[N]ow the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life,—the
right to be let alone . . . .
—Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis1
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INTRODUCTION
We live in a unique and momentous era of human history. This era will be
characterized by future generations as a dialectic struggle between power—the mod-
ern technologies that inspire and make possible grand egalitarian achievement—and
responsibility—the normative principles that inform how egalitarian ends ought to be
defined.2 This dialectic is especially pronounced at the intersection of homeland security
and constitutional law.3 Although constitutional law has evolved to accommodate
a wide diversity of powerful modern technologies, such as nuclear power,4 the Internet,5
and Global Positioning Systems (GPS),6 constitutional law has failed to anticipate ade-
quately advances in molecular spectroscopy7 and fiber laser8 technology that threaten
2 See HANS JONAS, THE IMPERATIVE OF RESPONSIBILITY: IN SEARCH OF AN ETHICS FOR THE
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE at ix–x (Hans Jonas & David Herr trans., 1984).
3 Modern presidents, as commanders of a technologically advanced military, struggle with
this tension every day while in office. See Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant
Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Auth. for Use of Military Force
to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the U.S. 4 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.justice
.gov/olc/docs/memomilitaryforcecombatus10232001.pdf (“The text, structure and history of the
Constitution establish that the Founders entrusted the President with the primary responsibility,
and therefore the power, to ensure the security of the United States . . . .”).
4 The Supreme Court has held that Congress and state legislatures, rather than federal courts,
are responsible for resolving fundamental policy questions with respect to nuclear energy devel-
opment. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
557–58 (1978) (“Congress has made a choice to at least try nuclear energy, establishing a reason-
able review process in which courts are to play only a limited role.”).
5 The Supreme Court has held that provisions of a statute prohibiting the communication of
obscene, indecent, or patently offensive content to minors via the Internet were facially overbroad
in violation of the First Amendment. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 878–79 (1997) (“Under the
[Communications Decency Act], a parent allowing her 17-year-old to use the family computer
to obtain information on the Internet that she, in her parental judgment, deems appropriate could
face a lengthy prison term. . . . [W]e are persuaded that the CDA is not narrowly tailored . . . .”).
6 The Supreme Court has also, poignantly for this Note, held that a “search” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs when a government agent plants and uses a GPS
tracking device to gather intelligence on a person’s vehicle. See United States v. Jones, 132
S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (“[T]he Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s ve-
hicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”
(footnote omitted)).
7 Molecular spectroscopy refers to the technique of measuring the “set of differences be-
tween the possible energy levels [of a molecule], which is related to an observed set of reso-
nances in the electromagnetic radiation spectrum . . . .” JEFFREY I. STEINFELD, MOLECULES AND
RADIATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN MOLECULAR SPECTROSCOPY 1 (2d ed. 1985). In
other words, molecular spectroscopy identifies the exact chemical composition of a sample
by stimulating the sample with energy and observing the unique behavior of its constituent
chemical compounds.
8 A fiber laser is a type of Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation
(LASER) device characterized by, among other things, an active medium composed of glass
“doped with rare earth ions.” KARL F. RENK, BASICS OF LASER PHYSICS 288 (2012). This active
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to overwhelm current privacy doctrine, especially as applied in the context of the
War on Terror9 and the Drug War.10
This Note is organized into six parts and proceeds as follows. Part I defines
“privacy” and examines the value of privacy as traditionally recognized in the con-
text of identity formation, social cooperation, and law enforcement. Part II discusses
the right to privacy historically as developed through the common law, constitutional
law, federal legislation, and international law. Part III distinguishes molecular scanners
from less powerful scanning technologies by contrasting millimeter wave and back-
scatter imaging technology with the picosecond synchronized programmable laser
(PSPL), a molecular scanner developed for use by the United States Department of
Homeland Security.11 Part IV examines molecular scanning as applied in the context
of the War on Terror and the Drug War and analyzes whether molecular scanning con-
stitutes a “search” under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, whether such a search
is reasonable, whether storing molecular scan data is reasonable, and whether molec-
ular scanning violates the Fourth Amendment as constructed with the First Amendment.
Part IV also suggests that ambiguities in current Fourth Amendment doctrine and the
absence of minimum quantity thresholds for contraband possession could undermine
privacy if left unaddressed. Finally, the Conclusion summarizes the arguments of the
previous parts and offers a call to action.
I. KNOWLEDGE IS POWER: THE VALUE OF PRIVACY
A. Privacy Defined
The English word “privacy” is derived from the Latin words privatus, meaning
“withdrawn from public life,” and privare, meaning “to bereave or deprive.”12 Under
Roman law, privatus referred to “private” ownership, in contradistinction to ownership
medium produces a high-power beam that is capable of maintaining integrity over a long distance
and penetrating or cutting solid materials. See id.
9 The War on Terror refers to the international military campaign by the United States to
eliminate al-Qaeda and all other global terrorist networks which was declared by the Bush ad-
ministration in September 2001 in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. See
Kenneth R. Bazinet, Fight vs. Evil, Bush & Cabinet Tell America, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 17,
2001), http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/fight-evil-bush-cabinet-america-article-1
.933901 (reporting on a “weekend war” council by President Bush mere days after the 9/11
attacks); Alexandra Silver, How America Became a Surveillance State, TIME (Mar. 18, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1973131,00.html (discussing the historical ante-
cedents to the War on Terror).
10 The Drug War refers to the international military campaign by the United States to reduce
the possession, use, and trade of illegal drugs. See generally ARTHUR BENAVIE, DRUGS:
AMERICA’S HOLY WAR (2009) (arguing for an end to the Drug War); DRUG WAR AMERICAN
STYLE: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF FAILED POLICY AND ITS ALTERNATIVES (Jurg Gerber
& Eric L. Jensen eds., 2001) (discussing the historical context of the Drug War).
11 See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
12 RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 242 (rev.
ed. 1976).
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by the populus Romanus, or “people of the republic.”13 The word “privacy” is often un-
translatable by linguists because many languages lack a specific word to describe the
concept of privacy.14 Although this might suggest that the concept of privacy is particu-
larly modern or regional, ancient traditions, such as covering one’s genitals, evidence
a ubiquitous instinct toward privacy.15
It is difficult to arrive at a consensus definition of privacy as there is frequent dis-
agreement about its component interests.16 Privacy can be characterized as having the
control necessary to exclude information about oneself from others so that one may re-
veal such information selectively.17 Privacy is related to the concepts of anonymity, the
desire to be nameless or unidentified in public, and pseudonymity, the desire to be
known by a false name in public.18 Bodily integrity may be another interest that com-
prises privacy.19 Samuel Warren and Justice Louis Brandeis, who originally described
the right to privacy and its importance in modern America, argued for a “general right
to privacy for thoughts, emotions, and sensations [that] should receive the same protec-
tion, whether expressed in writing, or in conduct, in conversation, in attitudes, or in
facial expression.”20
B. The Value of Privacy
The value of privacy, like any other value judgment, is subjective and varies be-
tween individuals.21 The unique cognitive schemas that individuals develop to interpret
their experience of reality are responsible for how individuals prioritize, or valuate, pos-
sible future states of being.22 Given that value is not an inherent property of objects
13 See ADOLF BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW 636, 651 (1953).
14 TRANSLATION TODAY: TRENDS AND PERSPECTIVES 73 (Gunilla Anderman & Margaret
Rogers eds., 2003).
15 See Genesis 3:7; Michael Balter, Clothes Make the (Hu) Man, SCI. MAG., Sept. 2009, at
1329, 1329.
16 See, e.g., Elbert Lin, Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1093–94 (2002).
17 See Eric Hughes, A Cypherpunk’s Manifesto, ACTIVISM.NET, http://www.activism.net
/cypherpunk/manifesto.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2013); Private Life, CSO MAG., Apr. 2003,
at 9, 9.
18 Jillian C. York, The Right to Anonymity Is a Matter of Privacy, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Jan. 28, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/01/right-anonymity-matter-privacy.
19 ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 101 (1988).
20 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 206.
21 LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 96 (Ludwig von
Mises Inst. 1998) (1949), available at http://mises.org/document/3250 (“Value is not in-
trinsic, it is not in things. It is within us; it is the way in which man reacts to the conditions
of his environment.”).
22 See id. See generally Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of
Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103 (2004) (examining
the concepts of stereotypes, categories, schemas, and knowledge structures, and their relevance
to legal scholarship).
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or behavioral norms, generalizations about the value of privacy must accommodate
a diverse range of possible perspectives.23
Privacy can be said to have functional utility because it plays a central role in facili-
tating identity formation,24 social cooperation,25 and law enforcement,26 among other
social processes. Privacy is necessary for identity formation because it provides one the
space necessary to explore new interests and activities, commit to a unique set of per-
sonal values, and adapt one’s values to changing circumstances.27 Privacy is necessary
for social cooperation because the individuation that privacy encourages enables eco-
nomic specialization and demand for a wide diversity of goods and services.28 Finally,
privacy is necessary for law enforcement because it provides a critical check to abuses
of government authority, especially given the corrupting nature of power and of the vast
superiority of the government’s resources over those of the average citizen or group.29
23 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that
expectations of privacy are “subjective”).
24 See Andrik Becht et al., Relations Between Parental Privacy Invasion and Identity
Formation During Adolescence 12 (June 21, 2011) (unpublished Bachelor thesis, Utrecht
University), available at http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/student-theses/2011-1003-200747
/UUindex.html (“For a healthy identity formation it is necessary that the adolescent becomes
autonomous, and develops a sense of privacy.” (citations omitted)).
25 JAMES E. CÔTÉ & CHARLES G. LEVINE, IDENTITY FORMATION, AGENCY, AND CULTURE:
A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL SYNTHESIS 130 (2002) (“[P]revious types of societies presented their
own difficulties that many of those accustomed to late modern society would likely have found
unbearable (e.g., a lack of privacy, close informal social control, low levels of intellectual de-
velopment, [and] few opportunities for creativity and self-actualization . . . ).”); see Sheldon
Richman, Social Cooperation, Part 2, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www
.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/social-cooperation-part-2#ixzz2J8POER1D (quoting HERBERT
SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 482–83 (1850)) (“Paradoxical though the assertion looks, the progress
is at once toward complete separateness and complete union. But the separateness is of a kind
consistent with the most complex combinations for fulfilling social wants; and the union is of a
kind that does not hinder entire development of each personality. . . . [This will eventuate in
producing] at once perfect individuation and perfect mutual dependence.”).
26 See Paul De Hert & Serge Gutwirth, Privacy, Data Protection and Law Enforcement.
Opacity of the Individual and Transparency of Power, in PRIVACY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
71–74 (Erik Claes et al. eds., 2006) (“[P]rivacy in a constitutional democratic state represents a
legal weapon against the development of absolute balances of power . . . .”).
27 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 763 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Privacy is the
basis of individuality.” (quoting R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 287 (1970)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see Becht et al., supra note 24, at 4.
28 CÔTÉ & LEVINE, supra note 25, at 130; see Richman, supra note 25.
29 See De Hert & Gutwirth, supra note 26, at 13 (“[P]rivacy is the legal recognition of the re-
sistance or reticence to behaviour steered or induced by power.”); see also Barton Gellman &
Greg Miller, U.S. Spy Network’s Successes, Failures and Objectives Detailed in ‘Black Budget’
Summary (Aug. 29, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08-29/world/41709796
_1_intelligence-community-intelligence-spending-national-intelligence-program (describing a
portion of the extensive resources employed by the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct
foreign and domestic surveillance).
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C. The Coercive Power of Knowledge
The fundamental role that privacy plays in facilitating human social processes
creates a powerful incentive to manipulate the economic, social, and political environ-
ment.30 Not surprisingly, then, the public policy debate over privacy has been character-
ized as a struggle of control between private actors and government actors.31 The
interrelatedness of privacy and control is reflected in the Latin proverb, “[Q]uis custo-
diet ipsos [c]ustodes?,”32 which means, “Who watches the watchers?,” as well as in the
English phrase, “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”33
Approaches to privacy rights can generally be characterized as either free market34
or protectionist.35 In a free market, defined by strict adherence to individual property
and contracting rights, standards of privacy are determined through market competition,
with consumers choosing to do business with those corporations that offer the desired
level of privacy protection.36 Those corporations that do not respect the privacy of their
30 E.C. Pasour, Jr., Rent Seeking: Some Conceptual Problems and Implications, REV. OF
AUSTRIAN ECON., Mar. 1987, at 127 (quoting Dwight R. Lee, Reverse Revenue Sharing: The
Importance of Process in Controlling Government (Mar. 24–26, 1983) (paper presented at Public
Choice Meetings, Savannah, Georgia)), available at http://www.mises.org/journals/rae/pdf/rae1
_1_8.pdf (“[T]he existence of political power, even when restrained, establishes potential oppor-
tunities for some to benefit at the expense of others that will never be completely ignored . . . .
There can be no reasonable doubt that there has been a dramatic expansion in the range of activi-
ties that have been subjected to government control over the last century.”); see also Jonathan
Watts, NSA Accused of Spying on Brazilian Oil Company Petrobras (Sept. 9, 2013, 11:55 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/09/nsa-spying-brazil-oil-petrobras (reporting on
“accusations that [the] NSA is conducting intelligence-gathering operations that go beyond its
core mission of national security”).
31 See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government:
Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 455, 457
(1995) (characterizing privacy as “being able to control the use or dissemination—within the
government itself or to outsiders—of personal information from or about them that the govern-
ment has collected from them in pursuit of one facet or another of its vast and multifarious sub-
stantive mission”).
32 Juvenal, Satire VI, in THE SATIRES OF JUVENAL 92, 118 (G. Lowes Dickinson & H. O.
Meredith eds., J. M. Dent & Co. 1906); Bruce Schneier, The Eternal Value of Privacy, WIRED
(May 18, 2006), http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2006
/05/70886.
33 Schneier, supra note 32 (quoting Letter from John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton to
Mandell Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887), in HISTORICAL ESSAYS AND STUDIES 504, 504 (John Neville
Figgis & Reginald Vere Laurence eds., 1907)).
34 COMM. ON PRIVACY IN THE INFO. AGE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENGAGING PRIVACY
& INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN A DIGITAL AGE 67–68 (James Wald et al. eds., 2007), avail-
able at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11896&page=67.
35 Id. at 73–74.
36 See Peter P. Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement in the
Protection of Personal Information, in PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION
AGE 2 (1997), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/1997/privacy-and-self-regulation
-information-age.
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customers risk losing market share to those corporations that do.37 If, however, market
competition is distorted, perhaps by state grants of privilege to certain corporations over
others, then corporations may offer inferior privacy policies or inferior transparency
about privacy practices relative to consumer demand.38 A protectionist approach, in
contrast, acknowledges that consumer demand for privacy, as well as the level of pri-
vacy protection offered by corporations, is constrained by information asymmetry and
other possible market failures.39 To compensate for those failures, therefore, a pro-
tectionist approach advocates that privacy standards be engineered top-down and
enforced by a central government.40 Studies demonstrating that commercial privacy
policies are often above the reading level of the average person support a more pro-
tectionist approach.41
Political privacy concerns the fairness of election procedures and has been a con-
cern since the emergence of democratic forms of governance.42 Secret balloting, a
method developed to protect political privacy, helps to ensure that votes are not ob-
tained through force or the threat of force because voters preserve their anonymity
while casting ballots in secure voting booths.43 Despite the inevitability of some fraudu-
lent votes entering the system, secret balloting is widely used to combat voter fraud and
is considered a basic right of citizenship in many modern democracies.44
II. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY HISTORICALLY
A. Common Law
In a memorandum to the European Commission, the U.S. Department of
Commerce stated, “The right to recover damages for invasion of personal privacy is
37 See id.
38 See id. at 5–7.
39 See id. at 5.
40 See id. at 4.
41 Carlos Jensen & Colin Potts, Privacy Policies as Decision-Making Tools: An Evaluation
of Online Privacy Notices, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS
IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 471, 475 (2004).
42 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (“It is hardly a novel
perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may consti-
tute [an] effective . . . restraint on freedom of association . . . .”); Thomas Saalfeld, On Dogs and
Whips: Recorded Votes, in PARLIAMENTS AND MAJORITY RULE IN WESTERN EUROPE 531
(Herbert Döring ed., 1995) (noting the use of secret ballots in ancient Greece).
43 See Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600, 608 (6th Cir. 1981) (citing Detroit v. Rush, 46 N.W.
951 (Mich. 1890)) (emphasizing the importance of secret ballots in safeguarding “the purity of
our election process by eliminating the fear of scorn and ridicule, as well as lessening the evils
of violence, intimidation, bribery and other corrupt practices which can be incumbent in non-
secret elections”).
44 Id. (“[The right to a secret ballot] has been recognized as one of the fundamental civil lib-
erties of our democracy.” (citations omitted)).
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well established under U.S. common law.”45 Indeed, the right of privacy entered the
common law after Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren published The Right to Privacy
in 1890, in which they argued for more extensive legal protection for “the right to be
let alone” under the common law.46 In 1960, William Prosser helped formalize the com-
mon law right of privacy by describing four distinct privacy-based torts: (l) intrusion
upon the plaintiff’s seclusion, solitude, or private affairs; (2) public disclosure of
private facts which would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; (3) publicity
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation of
the plaintiff’s name or likeness for the defendant’s advantage.47 While the common
law, historically, gave definition and protection to various privacy rights, the mod-
ern trend is toward greater interpretation based on the will of the Supreme Court and
the legislature.48
B. Constitutional Doctrine
1. Fourth Amendment Text and Original Intent
The Bill of Rights was ratified on December 15, 1791.49 The Fourth Amendment,
specifically, was written in response to Writs of Assistance, that is, general warrants is-
sued by the British government that granted general search powers to British law en-
forcement officials.50 Those general search powers allowed such officials to search any
home, at any time, for any reason, or for no reason at all.51 This was an especially un-
popular concept in the colonies because many of the Sons of Liberty, including many
of the Founding Fathers, were smugglers.52 The text of the Fourth Amendment reads:
45 Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Commerce to European Comm’n, Damages for
Breaches of Privacy, Legal Authorizations, Mergers and Takeovers in U.S. Law (July 14, 2000),
available at http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/ecom/PRIVACYDAMAGESFINAL.htm.
46 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 193.
47 Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 921 n.16 (Cal. 1969) (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 829–51 (3d ed. 1964)); see also William L. Prosser, Privacy,
48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
48 Stephan Kinsella, Legislation and Law in a Free Society, MISES DAILY (Feb. 25, 2010),
http://mises.org/daily/4147 (“Historically, in the common law of England, Roman law, and the
Law Merchant, law was formed in large part in thousands of judicial decisions. In these so-called
‘decentralized law-finding systems,’ . . . statutes, or centralized law, played a relatively minor
role. Today, however, statutes passed by the legislature are becoming the primary source of
law . . . .”).
49 George Anastaplo, Amendments to the Constitution of the United States: A Commentary,
23 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 631, 636 n.10 (1992).
50 See Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth
Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 991 (2011).
51 FATHER OF CANDOR (PSEUDONYM), A LETTER CONCERNING LIBELS, WARRANTS, AND THE
SEIZURE OF PAPERS 45 (London 1764) (complaining that general warrants permitted arrests or
searches to be made at discretion by “any common fellows . . . upon their own imaginations, or
the surmises of their acquaintance, or upon other worse and more dangerous intimations . . .”).
52 Joseph C. Sweeney, The Silver Oar and Other Maces of the Admiralty: Admiralty
Jurisdiction in America and the British Empire, 38 J. MAR. L. & COM. 159, 166 (2007).
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.53
According to Robert Bork, “[The Fourth Amendment’s framers] had a specific principle
of privacy at work in the Fourth Amendment. It was privacy in your home and in your
office from search by the government. That is not just a broad ranging right of privacy
you can apply anywhere.”54
In the twentieth century, however, Justice Douglas, delivering the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,55 summarized some other textual bases
within the Bill of Rights that support an expanded right to privacy:
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of asso-
ciation contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one,
as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against
the quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of peace without
the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The
Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the “right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.” The Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
which government may not force him to surrender to his detri-
ment. The Ninth Amendment provides: “The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.”56
Justice Douglas’s opinion in Griswold foreshadowed the opinion by Justice Blackmun
in Roe v. Wade,57 which found yet another textual home for the right to privacy, now
as a fundamental liberty incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.58
53 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
54 Robert’s Rules of Order: A Conversation with Robert Bork, HOOVER INST. (July 16, 2003),
http://www.hoover.org/multimedia/uncommon-knowledge/27065.
55 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
56 Id. at 484–85 (“[T]he zone of privacy [is] created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees.” (emphasis added)).
57 410 U.S. 113 (1973), modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
58 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”); Roe, 410 U.S. at 152, modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
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Although constitutional law scholars will disagree about the appropriate textual
home for the right of privacy, the right of privacy has ultimately been given definition
by judges through case law and legislators through statutes, as explored below.
2. Cases
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been shaped by diverse and fairly modern
case law. The following brief timeline of significant Supreme Court holdings will
help define the spectrum of cases in which the right of privacy has been invoked and
will reinforce that a right to privacy is essential to managing increasingly intrusive
practices by law enforcement.
The Fourth Amendment was an ineffective judicial tool prior to 1914.59 In 1914,
the U.S. Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States established the exclusionary rule,
which states that evidence obtained through unconstitutional means is inadmissible
in court and cannot be used against a defendant as part of the prosecution’s case.60
Prior to the Court’s ruling in Weeks, law enforcement officials could secure evi-
dence in violation of the Fourth Amendment and use that evidence at trial without
fear of punishment.61 Later, in 1961, the Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio held that an
individual’s Fourth Amendment right to privacy is enforceable against the states “in
the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by the Due Process
Clause.”62 In 2001, the Supreme Court in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista63 held that
arrests and searches are only to be performed without a warrant if the officer per-
sonally witnesses or has reasonable cause to believe that the suspect has committed
a specific misdemeanor or felony.64
In 1923, the Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska65 held that the liberties protected
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment include more than
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the indi-
vidual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (“In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed,
found at least the roots of that right . . . in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section
of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citations omitted)).
59 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (“If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evi-
dence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring
his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and . . . might as well be
stricken from the Constitution.”).
60 Id. at 392 (“The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain
conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions . . . should find no sanction
in the judgments of the courts . . . .”).
61 See id.
62 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
63 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
64 See id. at 354.
65 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his
own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long rec-
ognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happi-
ness by free men.66
This holding later influenced the reasoning of Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut in finding an expanded right to privacy in the “penumbras” of the Constitution.67
In 1925, the Supreme Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters68 ruled that an Oregon
law requiring that children attend public schools violated the constitutionally pro-
tected right of “parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control.”69 The choice of where a parent should send his or her
child to school falls within a zone of privacy that is fundamentally protected from
government interference.70
In 1965, the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut struck down a Connecti-
cut law that prohibited the use of contraceptives in violation of the “right of marital
privacy.”71 Later, in 1972, the Supreme Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird72 extended the
same privacy right protecting access to contraception to single persons.73
In 1967, the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States held that the protections of the
Fourth Amendment apply to wiretapping and that no police or other government agent
can tap a public phone without first obtaining a warrant.74 Emphasizing that the Fourth
Amendment protects people in addition to places, Justice Stewart wrote that the Fourth
Amendment guarantees protection for individual privacy in any context where the indi-
vidual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.75 In a concurring opinion, Justice John
Marshall Harlan added:
As the Court’s opinion states, “the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.” The question, however, is what protection it
66 Id. at 399.
67 See 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
68 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
69 Id. at 534–35.
70 Id.
71 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86 (“Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts
of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to
the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”).
72 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
73 Id. at 453–54.
74 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967) (“The Government . . . argues that sur-
veillance of a telephone booth should be exempted from the usual requirement of advance autho-
rization by a magistrate upon a showing of probable cause. We cannot agree.”).
75 Id. at 351–52 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.” (citations omitted)).
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affords to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that ques-
tion requires reference to a “place.” My understanding of the rule
that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold re-
quirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.”76
Contemporary Fourth Amendment analysis applies the same two-fold requirement, al-
though there has been much scholarly debate over the reasoning of both Justice Stewart
and Justice Harlan.77
In 1968, the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio78 held that a police officer who had
a reasonable belief that the defendant was contemplating robbery, an offense often re-
quiring the use of a weapon, did not exceed the scope of a reasonable search in patting
down the defendant’s outer clothing and disarming him.79
In 1973, the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade held that the constitutionally protected
right to privacy was “broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy.”80 Although Justice Blackmun does not specifically apply
Fourth Amendment doctrine in his opinion, his opinion serves as a powerful endorse-
ment for privacy as a fundamental right that protects basic and intimately personal ac-
tivities, like childbirth.81
In 1985, the Supreme Court in Winston v. Lee82 held that surgical intrusion into an
attempted robbery suspect’s chest to recover a bullet fired by his victim was unreason-
able under the Fourth Amendment where such surgery required non-trivial medical
risks and where there was no compelling need to recover the bullet in light of other
available evidence.83 Also, Justice Brennan, in delivering the opinion of the Court, char-
acterized privacy as “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men.”84
In 1985, the Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O.85 held that teachers and admin-
istrators do not need probable cause that a crime has been committed before conducting
76 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
77 See Afsheen John Radsan, The Case for Stewart Over Harlan on 24/7 Physical
Surveillance, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1475, 1493 n.123 (2010).
78 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
79 See id. at 30.
80 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
81 See generally id.
82 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
83 Id. at 766.
84 Id. at 758–59 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
85 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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a search of students.86 Instead, such a search must only meet a standard of “reason-
ableness, under all the circumstances.”87 Under that standard, school officials may
conduct a search only if they have a reasonable suspicion that a school rule or law has
been broken, and only if the search itself is conducted in a reasonable manner.88
In 1995, the Supreme Court in Vernonia School District v. Acton89 held that the
district’s mandatory drug testing program for student athletes did not violate students’
Fourth Amendment rights and that such a test was not unreasonably invasive of stu-
dents’ privacy.90 The Court held that the drug testing program met the standard of
reasonableness established in New Jersey v. T.L.O., citing the school’s history of drug
problems, the failure of past attempted corrective policies, and the environment of peer
pressure on student athletes as compelling reasons to allow such searches.91 The Court
argued that student athletes are accustomed to less privacy than other students be-
cause they shower and dress in a common locker room, evidencing the Court’s will-
ingness to find different reasonable expectations of privacy even between students
of the same school.92
In 2001, the Supreme Court in Kyllo v. United States93 held that the use of sense-
enhancing technology not in use by the general public, in this case thermal imaging
technology, to obtain information about the interior of a home that could only have
otherwise been obtained by physical intrusion into that home constitutes a search and
is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.94 The Court also gave an uncharacter-
istically strong endorsement of the Constitution’s original intent by stating that courts
must “assure[ ] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”95
Recently, in 2012, the Supreme Court in United States v. Jones held that a “search”
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs when a government agent plants
and uses a GPS tracking device to gather intelligence on a person’s vehicle.96 Accord-
ing to the Court, vehicles are an “effect” that deserve protection under the Fourth
Amendment, which protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects.”97 The Court goes on to distinguish “searches” from
86 Id. at 341.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 341–42.
89 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
90 Id. at 660–61.
91 Id. at 662–63.
92 Id. at 657.
93 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
94 Id. at 40.
95 Id. at 34.
96 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
97 Id. at 946–47 (emphasis added).
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“seizures” by stating that a “physical intrusion” by a government agent on a constitu-
tionally protected area for the purpose of obtaining information constitutes a search
within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.98 Seizure of property, on the
other hand, is not characterized by mere trespass, but by “some meaningful interference
with an individual’s possessory interests in [ ] property.”99 The Court also reaffirmed
its holding in United States v. Knotts100 by stating that open fields, like public thor-
oughfares, are not one of the protected areas enumerated in the Fourth Amendment.101
The Court did not reach the question of whether searches by GPS tracking devices are
themselves reasonable, only that a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
protection had indeed occurred in this case.102
In assessing the salient points of the foregoing case law, consider that this Note
is concerned primarily with outlining the outer boundary of when the use of molec-
ular scanners, an advanced imaging technology, constitutes a Fourth Amendment
violation.103 To assess, on the merits, whether a Fourth Amendment violation has
occurred, it must be determined whether the Fourth Amendment is applicable, whether
a search or seizure did in fact occur, and whether the Fourth Amendment requirements
of probable cause, warrant, and reasonableness are satisfied.104 Part IV analyzes how
the use of molecular scanners in the context of the War on Terror and the Drug War
specifically implicates this and other Fourth Amendment doctrine.
Before exploring the advanced capabilities of molecular scanning technology in
Part III, this Note will examine a selection of federal and international legislation to
give a better sense of how the right to privacy has evolved over the last century to ac-
commodate the increasing need for responsible information management.
C. Federal Legislation
Several pieces of federal legislation were introduced in the twentieth century
to expand government control over domestic information monitoring, including the
98 Id. at 949.
99 Id. at 958 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
100 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
101 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948; see Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.
102 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954.
103 Accordingly, this Note does not consider preliminary questions, such as whether the court
has jurisdiction, whether the claim is justiciable, and whether government action caused the
harm. Questions regarding the remedies for a Fourth Amendment violation, which would impli-
cate extended discussion of the exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule, and civil damages, are
similarly outside the scope of this Note. See Russell W. Galloway Jr., Basic Fourth Amendment
Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 737, 739 (1992).
104 See id. at 738–39.
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Communications Act,105 the National Security Act,106 Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act (Wiretap Act),107 the Privacy Act,108 the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),109 the Computer Matching and Privacy Act
(amending the Privacy Act),110 the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA),111
and the Paperwork Reduction Act.112
105 Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–
615 (2006)) (creating the Federal Communications Commission “[f]or the purpose of regu-
lating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make
available . . . a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication
service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for the purpose of the national defense,
[and] for the purpose of promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire and
radio communications”).
106 National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. §§ 401–442a (2006)) (establishing and empowering Congress with oversight power
over the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Army, the Department of the
Navy, the Department of the Air Force, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National
Security Council (NSC)).
107 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat.
197, 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2006)) (creating the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration (LEAA), altering the admissibility criteria for confessions in criminal
trials, establishing procedures to allow wiretapping by law enforcement authorities, and regulat-
ing firearm sales and possession).
108 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(2006)) (requiring government agencies to share any records kept about an individual with an-
other agency upon request, requiring agencies to follow “fair information practices” that restrict
how personal information is acquired and shared, and creating a judicial remedy against the gov-
ernment for violation of the Act); see also Julianne M. Sullivan, Will the Privacy Act of 1974 Still
Hold Up in 2004? How Advancing Technology Has Created A Need for Change in the “System
of Records” Analysis, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 395, 395 n.1 (2003); The Privacy Act of 1974, ELEC.
PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/1974act/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
109 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 50 U.S.C.) (empowering the President to authorize
the physical and electronic surveillance of “foreign powers” and “agents of foreign powers” for
the purpose of obtaining “foreign intelligence information,” so long as information on U.S. citi-
zens is not collected, with a court order, without a court order, and in times of war).
110 Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-503, 102 Stat.
2507 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006)) (institutionalizing data sharing among fed-
eral government agencies).
111 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (cod-
ified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22, 2701–11, 3121–27 (2006)) (increasing protection for
wire, oral, and electronic communications, including those stored on computers; strengthening
certain search warrant requirements; and prohibiting the use of pen registers and certain recording
devices without first obtaining a court order).
112 Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163 (codified at 44
U.S.C. §§ 3501–20 (2006)) (instructing the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to man-
age the information activities of federal agencies such that they comply with the requirements
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Following the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on the United States,113
several new pieces of legislation were introduced that expanded the power of the federal
government to guard against domestic acts of terror. The most prominent piece of such
legislation was the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act).114 Other legis-
lation that has supplemented the power of the federal government following 9/11 and
consequently weakened privacy protections includes the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA)115 and the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act (9/11 Commission Act).116
U.S. federal legislation following the 9/11 terrorist attacks that empowered law
enforcement officials with greater search powers indicates a global trend toward sacri-
ficing privacy in favor of greater security, despite long-standing international law recog-
nizing privacy as a universal right.
D. International Law
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which was adopted in
1950 by the Council of Europe, protects the right to a private life for all Europeans,
of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Privacy Act, and the Computer Security Act
of 1987).
113 In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see
NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (2004), available
at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
114 Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept And Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.
(2006)) (targeting domestic terrorism by, among other things, easing electronic surveillance re-
strictions on law enforcement agencies attempting to collect voice and data communications of
Americans suspected of terrorist activities, expanding the authority of the Secretary of the
Treasury, and increasing the power of immigration authorities to detain and deport immigrants
suspected of terrorism); see Susan N. Herman, The USA PATRIOT Act and the Submajoritarian
Fourth Amendment, 41 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 67 (2006); Ronald J. Sievert, Patriot
2005–2007: Truth, Controversy, and Consequences, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 319 (2007); USA
Patriot Act, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/ (last visited
Oct. 21, 2013).
115 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat.
3638 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 6, 8, 18, 22, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C. (2006))
(appointing a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and creating the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC) and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board).
116 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
53, 121 Stat. 266 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 6, 8, 22, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.
(2009)) (implementing recommendations from the 9/11 Commission, including inspecting all
cargo entering the United States by air or sea and creating multijurisdictional information sharing
centers known as Fusion Centers).
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except for citizens of Belarus and Kosovo, stating: “Everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”117 Additionally,
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg has declared privacy a positive
right of all people.118
Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of the United
Nations, which was adopted in 1966, also protects privacy, stating: “No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or corre-
spondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”119
Now that some of the history of the right to privacy has been laid bare, let us exam-
ine in detail molecular spectroscopy and fiber laser technology and how these scientific
achievements will impact law enforcement and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in
the twenty-first century.
III. DISTINGUISHING MOLECULAR SCANNERS FROM SIMILAR TECHNOLOGIES
A. “Molecular Scanner” Defined
“Molecular scanner” is a colloquialism that refers to advanced imaging technology
capable of penetrating, among other materials, biological tissues at short-to-medium
range through a process of fiber laser-induced molecular resonance, and a combination
of mid-IR spectroscopy, coherent anti-Stokes Raman scattering (CARS), and terahertz
spectroscopy.120 This subsection will briefly explain fiber laser technology and some
of the spectroscopic techniques that may be applied during a “molecular scan.”
A fiber laser is a type of LASER device containing a dichroitic end mirror, an out-
put coupling mirror, and an active medium composed of glass “doped with rare earth
117 Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_ENG.pdf.
118 See id.
119 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 14668.
120 See Hidden Government Scanners Will Instantly Know Everything About You From
164 Feet Away, GIZMODO (July 10, 2012, 9:40 AM), http://gizmodo.com/5923980/the
-secret-government-laser-that-instantly-knows-everything-about-you [hereinafter Government
Scanners] (“[A] new laser-based molecular scanner.” (emphasis added)); see also How Tunable
Lasers Are Revolutionizing Spectroscopy, GENIA PHOTONICS (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.genia
photonics.com/publications/technical-notes/2012/10/how-tunable-lasers-are-revolutionizing
-spectroscopy/ (discussing spectroscopic applications of fiber-based tunable laser sources);
Youngjae Kim et al., Lasers and Optics Interface: Multiphoton Spectroscopy, GENIA
PHOTONICS (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.geniaphotonics.com/publications/technical-notes/2012/01
/multiphoton-spectroscopy/ (differentiating various “multiphoton” spectroscopy techniques). See
generally B. J. Orr et al., Spectroscopic Applications of Tunable Optical Parametric Oscillators,
in TUNABLE LASER APPLICATIONS 15–95 (F. J. Duarte ed., 2d ed. 2009).
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ions.”121 Fiber lasers obtain high optical gain by channeling photons through long, yet
compact, coils of flexible glass fiber.122 This fiber produces a high-quality optical beam
and supports high levels of continuous output power by cooling efficiently.123 Fiber la-
sers are often used to cut, weld, and fold metals and polymers.124 When used for spec-
troscopy, multiple fiber lasers may be synchronized and pulsed to obtain a multi- or
hyper-spectral image of a target.125
Molecular spectroscopy refers to the technique of measuring the “set of differences
between the possible energy levels [of a molecule], which is related to an observed set
of resonances in the electromagnetic radiation spectrum . . . .”126 Every molecule with
a unique chemical composition emits a unique spectrum of electromagnetic radiation
when excited.127 By utilizing spectrographic techniques to observe this spectrum, one
can identify the exact chemical composition of a target substance.128
Mid-IR spectroscopy, CARS, and terahertz spectroscopy are three particularly
powerful spectroscopy techniques that are rapidly becoming popular in the chemical,
pharmaceutical, biomedical, defense, security, environmental protection, and commu-
nications industries, among others.129 These techniques are highly sensitive to molecular
vibrations and achieve a higher signal yield than other spectroscopy techniques.130
Real-time imaging with these techniques is possible given that spectroscopic readings
can be processed in mere “picoseconds.”131 Virtually any type of substance can be
identified with these techniques.132 Terahertz waves, in particular, can penetrate a
wide variety of materials, including clothing, paper, plastics, leather, wood, and
ceramics.133 Terahertz radiation can also penetrate biological tissues without causing
harmful photoionization.134
121 RENK, supra note 8, at 288.
122 See C. BRECK HITZ ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO LASER TECHNOLOGY 201 (4th ed. 2012);
RARE EARTH DOPED FIBER LASERS AND AMPLIFIERS 255 (Michel J. F. Digonnet ed., 2001).
123 How Fibre Lasers Work, UNIV. OF SOUTHAMPTON OPTOELECTRONICS RESEARCH CTR.
(2006), http://www.orc.soton.ac.uk/61.html.
124 Patrick Waurzyniak, Lasers Cut Medical Devices with Precision, Speed, MANUFAC-
TURING ENGINEERING, May 2012, at 69, available at http://www.sme.org/MEMagazine/Article
.aspx?id=50906.
125 See Chemical Detection and Sensing, GENIA PHOTONICS, http://www.geniaphotonics.com
/business-markets/defense-and-security/ds-chemical-detection-sensing/ (last visited Oct. 21,
2013); Kim et al., supra note 120, at 2.
126 STEINFELD, supra note 7, at 1.
127 See id.
128 Chemical Detection and Sensing, supra note 125; see also STEINFELD, supra note 7, at 1.
129 See Kim et al., supra note 120, at 3; Terahertz Spectroscopy, GENIA PHOTONICS, http://
www.geniaphotonics.com/business-markets/defense-and-security/terahertz-spectroscopy/ (last
visited Oct. 21, 2013).
130 Chemical Detection and Sensing, supra note 125, at 1; Kim et al., supra note 120, at 2.
131 See Kim et al., supra note 120, at 3.
132 See Terahertz Spectroscopy, supra note 129, at 1.
133 Id.; Kim et al., supra note 120, at 2.
134 Terahertz Spectroscopy, supra note 129, at 1.
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B. Comparison to Backscatter and Millimeter Wave Technology
According to public testimony by the Honorable Tara O’Toole, Undersecretary for
Science and Technology at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DHS
will deploy new molecular scanning technology at security checkpoints around the
country as soon as this year (2013).135 The scanners will have an effective range of 164
feet (50 meters) and will allow security agents to detect anything from “traces of drugs
or gun powder on your clothes to what you had for breakfast to the adrenaline level in
your body.”136 Not only is the scan non-invasive, but it is also undetectable to unsus-
pecting targets of the scan.137 Variants of this technology have been deployed in the
Middle East for detecting improvised explosive devices (IEDs).138
Technology like the picosecond synchronized programmable laser (PSPL) devel-
oped by Genia Photonics will slowly replace older backscatter X-ray and millimeter
wave technologies over the next few years.139 Backscatter X-ray technology generates
a target’s image by directing X-rays (electromagnetic radiation with a wavelength be-
tween 0.01 to 10 nanometers) toward the target and measuring the pattern of X-rays
absorbed and scattered by that target.140 Millimeter wave technology, similarly, gener-
ates a target’s image by directing microwaves (electromagnetic radiation with a wave-
length between 1 to 10 millimeters) toward the target and measuring the pattern of
microwaves absorbed and scattered by that target.141 Unlike PSPLs, backscatter X-ray
scanners and millimeter wave scanners are bulky, immobile, short-range, and, while
capable of penetrating clothing, are limited to scanning the surface of a target.142
135 Testimony of Honorable Tara O’Toole, M.D., MPH Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Before the Committee on Homeland
Security Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies
(Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/11/16/testimony-honorable-tara-otoole-md
-mph-under-secretary-science-and-technology-us (“[Science and Technology Directorate]
(S&T) is investigating the feasibility of [Genia Photonics’ PSPL] to perform non-contact,
trace explosives detection . . . . All of these projects are expected to produce transition-ready
technologies in the next 12 to 24 months . . . . In-Q-Tel reports that $1 of government invest-
ment can attract $10 in private sector funding.” (emphasis added)).
136 Government Scanners, supra note 120.
137 Id.
138 See Standoff Explosive Detection, 3 IQT Q., no. 4, 2012, at 30, 31, available at http://
geniaphotonics.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Standoff-Explosive-Detection.pdf.
139 See Joshua Freed, TSA: X-Ray Scanners To Be Removed Over Privacy Issues, HUFFPOST
POL. (Jan. 19, 2013, 1:19 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/19/tsa-x-ray-scanners
_n_2511947.html; Kim et al., supra note 120, at 4.
140 See BART ELIAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40543, AIRPORT PASSENGER SCREENING:
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 30–33 (2010); William Harris, What’s the Differ-
ence Between Backscatter Machines and Millimeter Wave Scanners?, HOWSTUFFWORKS
(Nov.28, 2012), http://science.howstuffworks.com/backscatter-machines-vs-millimeter-wave
-scanners.htm.
141 See ELIAS, supra note 140, at 33; Harris, supra note 140.
142 See ELIAS, supra note 140, at 32; Harris, supra note 140.
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The emergence of resourceful organized crime and terrorist groups has urged the
transition to technology that is more effective at detecting concealed weapons, explo-
sives, chemical and biological warfare agents, and drug mixtures.143 Correspondingly,
molecular scanning technology, such as that developed by Genia Photonics, is “ten mil-
lion times faster” and “one million times more sensitive than any currently available
system.”144 Also, as opposed to other techniques that require personnel and complex in-
struments to come in contact with hazardous samples during field scanning, fiber laser-
based scanners scan safely from a distance.145
The value of powerful scanning technology to the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security and other security agencies is obvious. Implementation of this technology
could eliminate waiting times at security checkpoints, eliminate the need for selective
screening procedures, and provide a degree of thoroughness and reliability that was un-
imaginable with previous scanning technologies or even physical searches. The technol-
ogy news website Gizmodo, however, concluded its news release about the PSPL with
a warning against the possible misuse of this technology:
Going well beyond eavesdropping, it seems quite possible that
[the] U.S. government plans on recording molecular data on trav-
elers without their consent, or even knowledge that it’s possible—
a scary thought. While . . . any technology that could replace an
aggressive pat-down is tempting, there’s a potential dark side
to [the PSPL], and we need to shine some light on it before
it’s implemented.146
Indeed, let us temper our enthusiasm for the indisputably vast potential applications for
molecular spectroscopy and fiber laser technology as we proceed to examine whether
certain uses of molecular scanners constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
IV. MOLECULAR SCANNING UNDER CURRENT LAW
Now that we have explored the meaning of privacy, the value of privacy, and some
of the diverse ways that the right to privacy has entered the law, let us focus on how
molecular scanners implicate specific Fourth Amendment doctrines.147 Part IV.A
analyzes, in the context of the War on Terror, whether a molecular scan by the
143 Chemical Detection and Sensing, supra note 125.
144 Government Scanners, supra note 120.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 For a Fourth Amendment analysis of the TSA’s use of another advanced screening tech-
nology, MALINTENT, which monitors travelers’ biometrics, see Lindsey Gil, Note, Bad Intent
or Just A Bad Day? Fourth Amendment Implications Raised by Technological Advances in
Security Screening, 16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 231 (2010).
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Transportation Security Administration (TSA)148 constitutes a “search” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, whether such a search is reasonable, whether stor-
ing molecular scan data is reasonable, and whether molecular scanning imposes a chill-
ing effect on personal activity in violation of the First Amendment. Part IV.B analyzes,
in the context of the Drug War, the plain view doctrine, contraband possession thresh-
olds, and how twenty-first century imaging could open the door to serious abuses of
individual privacy.149
A. The War on Terror and Warrantless Searches
1. Molecular Scanning as a “Search”
Generally, a search under the Fourth Amendment only “occurs when an expectation
of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.”150 This rule
holds true when applied in the context of an administrative search involving the use of
advanced imaging technology (AIT),151 like the picosecond synchronized programma-
ble laser (PSPL). In Electronic Privacy Information Center v. United States Department
of Homeland Security, the non-profit organization Electronic Privacy Information
Center, which reviews federal activities and policies to determine the impact on civil
liberties and privacy interests, petitioned to review a decision by the TSA to screen air-
line passengers via AIT.152 In this case the TSA used backscatter X-ray and millimeter
wave scanners, instead of magnetometers, which are limited to scanning for metallic
objects.153 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the TSA rule governing passen-
ger searches with AIT is a substantive legislative rule and thus required notice-and-
comment by the TSA.154 The court also held that, because the use of AIT is motivated
by a legitimate government purpose, namely, to ensure traveler safety, the use of AIT
148 About TSA, TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa (last visited Oct. 21, 2013) (“Following
September 11, 2001, the [TSA] was created to strengthen the security of the nation’s transpor-
tation systems and ensure the freedom of movement for people and commerce. Today, TSA
secures the nation’s airports and screens all commercial airline passengers and baggage.”).
149 This Note suggests that molecular scanning, in conjunction with ambiguous or unsettled
Fourth Amendment doctrine, could undermine individual privacy if left unaddressed. For a de-
tailed exploration of alternative Fourth Amendment models, see Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of
Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503 (2007), and Orin S. Kerr, Searches and
Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 565–84 (2005).
150 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
151 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
152 Id.
153 Id. at 2–3; see Tobias W. Mock, The TSA’s New X-Ray Vision: The Fourth Amendment
Implications of “Body-Scan” Searches at Domestic Airport Security Checkpoints, 49 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 213, 226 (2009) (“The non-metallic properties of these emerging threats have
rendered magnetometers obsolete and left the TSA scrambling for answers.”).
154 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 7–8.
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by the TSA constitutes a search that does not violate the Fourth Amendment.155 While
travelers passing through a TSA security checkpoint may have a subjective expectation
of privacy that is violated by an AIT scan, such travelers do not possess an objective ex-
pectation of privacy. That is, they do not possess an expectation of privacy that society
is prepared to consider reasonable given the need to ensure domestic security.156 Under
this rationale, then, a scan by the TSA for the purpose of ensuring traveler safety via a
PSPL, like a scan via traditional AIT, constitutes a legal search under the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.
Although a PSPL scan can be justified as a search by analogy to the less advanced
AIT, another theory, based on trespass, may also establish that a search occurs during
a PSPL scan. In United States v. Knotts,157 Justice Brennan explained in his concurring
opinion that when a government agent physically intrudes into “a constitutionally pro-
tected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of
the Fourth Amendment.”158 Recently, in United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court clar-
ified the relationship between physical intrusions and searches by holding that an at-
tempt to discover information accompanied by a trespass qualifies as a search under the
Fourth Amendment.159
Even in the absence of an actual physical intrusion, the Supreme Court has pro-
tected the expectation of privacy that one has over details usually only discoverable
by a close physical inspection. In Kyllo v. United States, the Court held that the
government’s use of surveillance technology not in use by the general public to ex-
plore the details of a home constitutes a search if those details would have been other-
wise unknowable without a physical intrusion into the home.160 Although Jones dealt
with a trespass against a suspect’s car,161 and Kyllo dealt with an act that was analo-
gous to a trespass against a suspect’s home,162 these cases suggest that a trespass
against a suspect’s body may also be considered a search and thus trigger Fourth
Amendment protections.
A scan by PSPL may arguably constitute an intangible trespass against real or
personal property163 because such a molecular scan uses electromagnetic radiation to
155 Id. at 10.
156 Id.
157 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
158 Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring).
159 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012).
160 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
161 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
162 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
163 Intangible intrusions by noise, odor, or light are usually treated as nuisances rather than
trespasses. See, e.g., Wendinger v. Forst Farms, Inc., 662 N.W.2d 546, 550–51 (Minn. Ct. App.
2003) (holding that invasive odors did not give rise to action for trespass because the odors
interfered with the use and enjoyment of property rather than with the exclusive possession
of property).
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penetrate a target’s skin and excite its molecules.164 According to American Jurispru-
dence, trespass requires an intentional act that is reasonably foreseeable to result in an
invasion affecting a property interest held in exclusive possession, an actual invasion
affecting that interest, and substantial damage to the interest.165 A molecular scan by the
TSA influences the motion and vibrations of a target’s molecules,166 which are other-
wise held in exclusive possession by the target. Such a scan is intentional, and under-
stood by the TSA to manipulate the motion of a target in a definite, though perhaps
inconspicuous, manner.167 Finally, unlike cases involving an intangible trespass against
real or personal property, where it can sometimes be difficult to prove damages,168 an
intangible intrusion that appropriates a target’s bodily information injures by compro-
mising the target’s ability to selectively reveal that closely held information.169 The in-
jury, however, is not to the target’s molecules, but to the value of the information about
the molecules. A molecular scan by the TSA, therefore, likely fails the final prong of
the test for trespass, which requires damage to the property interest itself, and thus does
not constitute a search under Jones.
A court could still apply an analysis based on physical intrusion to justify molecular
scanning as a search, however, by extending to the body the same constitutional protec-
tion extended to the home in Kyllo. Molecular scanners are a cutting-edge technology
not in use by the general public,170 and a molecular scan reveals more information about
a target’s body chemistry than could be acquired by the naked eye even during a physi-
cally invasive autopsy.171 It would seem, then, that if the body is as deserving of Fourth
Amendment protections as the home, courts should extend the holding in Kyllo to
find that a search occurs during a bodily scan that penetrates below the surface of a
target’s skin.
2. The Reasonableness of Molecular Scanning
Warrantless searches are ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of an “individ-
ualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”172 Administrative searches are unique, however, be-
cause they do not require any such suspicion.173 In United States v. Aukai,174 the Ninth
164 Imaging, GENIA PHOTONICS, http://www.geniaphotonics.com/business-markets/life
-sciences/imaging/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
165 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 27 (2013).
166 See Imaging, supra note 164.
167 Id.
168 See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc., 320 B.R. 772 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 339 B.R. 836
(S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 546 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that light signals transmitted by
means of fiber optic cable did not constitute a continuing trespass).
169 See supra text accompanying note 17.
170 See Distributors, GENIA PHOTONICS, http://www.geniaphotonics.com/distributors/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 21, 2013) (offering PSPLs exclusively through distributors located outside of the U.S.).
171 See Imaging, supra note 164.
172 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997).
173 Id. at 323.
174 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
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Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed its previous holding that warrantless and suspicion-
less administrative searches by the TSA are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
only if “conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an adminis-
trative purpose, namely, to prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard air-
craft, and thereby to prevent hijackings.”175 Also, the search must be confined in good
faith to that administrative purpose and be “no more . . . intensive than necessary, in
light of current technology . . . .”176 Although the Supreme Court has not commented
specifically on the reasonableness of using AIT to facilitate an administrative search,
it is clear that conducting such a search for the purpose of identifying contraband that
does not pose a danger to the safety of travelers falls outside of the permissible scope
of the search.177
Although the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in Electronic Privacy Information
Center v. Department of Homeland Security, attempted to balance privacy with security
by holding that any traveler subject to an administrative search by the TSA could
choose between receiving a pat-down or an AIT scan,178 such a choice between invasive
screening techniques may soon become unnecessary. A PSPL can deliver real-time
body imaging over a large area and without the knowledge of targets, thus mitigating
the need for random or selective screening at security checkpoints.179 Travelers, then,
will be forced to undergo a scan that is far more detailed and invasive than necessary,
especially relative to traditional AIT scans, and will have no option to opt out. Unless
the TSA develops strict definitions for the chemical compounds that give rise to added
suspicion, as well as a graphical interface that eliminates from view chemical informa-
tion wholly unrelated to identifying weapons and explosives, the use of molecular scan-
ning technology, like the PSPL, will unreasonably exceed the permissible scope of an
administrative search.180
Also, unlike a search via traditional scanning technology, which is limited to scan-
ning the surface of a target,181 a molecular scan by a PSPL is arguably unreasonable,
because it violates bodily integrity.182 In Winston v. Lee, the Supreme Court held that
175 Id. at 960 (quoting United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
176 Id. at 962 (internal quotations omitted).
177 See id.; United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973). While certain govern-
ment agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), have an interest in pre-
venting illicit drugs from being flown across the country and around the world, the TSA is
limited by its administrative purpose of protecting traveler safety and may not conduct a search
solely for the purpose of uncovering nonhazardous contraband. See About TSA, TSA, http://
www.tsa.gov/about-tsa (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
178 653 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
179 Government Scanners, supra note 120.
180 See Freed, supra note 139 (“Congress ordered that the [backscatter X-ray] scanners either
produce a more generic image or be removed . . . .”).
181 See ELIAS, supra note 140, at 30–33; Harris, supra note 140.
182 See Terahertz Spectroscopy, supra note 129.
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the reasonableness of surgical intrusions beneath the skin must weigh an individual’s
interest in privacy and security against society’s interests in conducting the proce-
dure.183 Similarly, in United States v. Husband,184 the court held that the Fourth
Amendment protects against damage to the individual’s sense of personal privacy
and security, including the individual’s fundamental interest in maintaining bodily in-
tegrity and control, regardless of whether a search involves bodily injury.185 While the
question of reasonableness still comes down to balancing individual privacy with the
government’s legitimate interest in providing security, the threat posed by permitting
government agents to beam strange penetrative radiation through the bodies of travelers
weighs in favor of PSPL scans being unreasonable.
3. The Reasonableness of Storing Molecular Scan Data
There are additional Fourth Amendment reasonableness concerns regarding the
storage of molecular scan data for later mining. The Electronic Privacy Center states
that sensitive data about one’s body “could provide the basis for a database of air trav-
eler profiles.”186 This means that the government could begin charting every subtle
change in a traveler’s body chemistry. In 2010, the U.S. Marshals Service was caught
storing “tens of thousands of images recorded with a millimeter wave system” without
the knowledge or consent of those scanned.187 The fear that the sensitive data gathered
by AIT devices will be made public is very real, given that massive leaks of AIT im-
ages have already occurred.188 Social networking pioneer Mark Zuckerberg is bullish
on the trend toward a lower objective expectation of privacy and projects that the rate
of personal data voluntarily shared will continue to double every ten years, such that
“10 years from now, people will be sharing about 1,000 times as many things as they
do today.”189 Despite the trend toward greater data sharing, however, the value of pri-
vacy to any individual is subjective, and care should be taken not to curtail the rights
of minorities simply because of the demonstrated preferences of the majority.
183 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985).
184 226 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2000).
185 Id. at 632.
186 Whole Body Imaging Technology and Body Scanners (“Backscatter” X-Ray and Milli-
meter Wave Screening), ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/airtravel/backscatter/
(last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
187 Declan McCullagh, Feds Admit Storing Checkpoint Body Scan Images, CNET NEWS
(Aug. 4, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20012583-281.html.
188 Joel Johnson, One Hundred Naked Citizens: One Hundred Leaked Body Scans, GIZMODO
(Nov. 16, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://gizmodo.com/5690749/these-are-the-first-100-leaked-body
-scans (“That we can see these images today almost guarantees that others will be seeing similar
images in the future.”).
189 Paul Sloan, Zuckerberg: In 10 Years, Folks Will Share 1,000 Times What They Do Now,
CNET NEWS (Oct. 20, 2012, 1:24 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57536659-93
/zuckerberg-in-10-years-folks-will-share-1000-times-what-they-do-now/ (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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The reasonableness requirement applies to both searches and seizures.190 A
“seizure” under the Fourth Amendment, in distinction to a “search,” occurs when
there is “meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in . . .
property.”191 Some seizures are unreasonable even if supported by a warrant or prob-
able cause and limited in scope,192 such as seizures that are “prolonged beyond the
time reasonably required.”193
Acquiring data from a molecular scan or generating an image based on that data
arguably does not constitute a seizure of information under existing case law.194 The
concept of seizure is generally thought of as requiring a “taking” in which an owner is
deprived of the thing being seized.195 Unlike with physical evidence, however, informa-
tion is nonrivalrous, such that “investigators can obtain a perfect copy without depriving
the owner of the original.”196 While at least one court has approved a warrant for seizing
intangible information,197 most courts have found that no seizure occurs when the gov-
ernment copies or reproduces data.
In United States v. Jacobsen, the Supreme Court held that a seizure of property
occurs when “there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory in-
terests in that property.”198 It seems, then, if copying information about the chemical
makeup of a person’s blood or brain “meaningfully interferes” with the person’s posses-
sory interest in that information, then creating the copy constitutes a seizure. In Arizona
v. Hicks,199 however, the Supreme Court held that a police officer who copied the serial
number information of a stereo system that he suspected was stolen “did not ‘meaning-
fully interfere’ with respondent’s possessory interest in either the serial numbers or the
equipment, and therefore did not amount to a seizure.”200 In United States v. Thomas,201
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a search, but not a seizure, occurred when
190 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1985).
191 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
192 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303 (1967) (suggesting there are “items of evidential
value whose very nature precludes them from being the object of a reasonable search and
seizure,” but failing to provide specific examples).
193 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005).
194 For a discussion on seizures of information stored in computer memory, see Kerr, Searches
And Seizures in a Digital World, supra note 149, at 557–65 (“Creating a bitstream copy should
require a warrant or an exception because of the way it manipulates the machine . . . .”).
195 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113; Kerr, Searches And Seizures in a Digital World, supra note
149, at 537.
196 Kerr, Searches And Seizures in a Digital World, supra note 149, at 560.
197 United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1457 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding a warrant that au-
thorized seizure of intangible property in the form of information regarding the status of a place).
198 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
199 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
200 Id. at 324 (holding, however, that by moving the equipment, the police did meaningfully
interfere with Hicks’ possessory interest in the equipment).
201 613 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1980).
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an FBI agent photocopied obscene materials that had escaped from a package during
transit for the purpose of proving a warrant affidavit.202 Similarly, in Bills v. Aseltine,203
the Sixth Circuit relied on Hicks and held that a seizure did not occur when police offi-
cers took photographs of a home during the execution of a search warrant.204 The court
stated, “the recording of visual images of a scene by means of photography does not
amount to a seizure because it does not ‘meaningfully interfere’ with any possessory
interest.”205 Also, in United States v. Gorshkov,206 a Washington federal district court
relied on Hicks and held that a search, but not a seizure, occurred when FBI agents ac-
cessed the Internet account of a suspect and downloaded his files without obtaining a
warrant because the data remained intact, unaltered, and accessible in the same manner
as before the download.207
The weak precedent regarding information as a seizable property interest makes it
all the more important to consider scans in public by AIT, like the PSPL, a search.208
If such scans are not considered a search and thus trigger no Fourth Amendment protec-
tions, then a suspect subject to an AIT scan will have no way of controlling the access
to or use of incredibly detailed personal information. Given that scan data is stored on
government machines, it would be impossible to know whether the acquired data is
being used for a limited purpose under current procedures.209 Control over the distribu-
tion of personal information is the hallmark of privacy, and any judicial regime that re-
spects privacy must responsibly limit downstream access to such information.210
4. The Intersection of Privacy and Free Speech
Consider the “chilling effect” on behavior that could be caused by allowing the
government to have unrestricted access to information regarding the body chemistry of
202 Id. at 793.
203 958 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1992).
204 Id. at 707.
205 Id.
206 No. CR00-550C, 2001 WL 1024026 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2001).
207 Id. at *3.
208 See Kerr, Searches And Seizures in a Digital World, supra note 149, at 560 (“The idea that
the government could freely generate copies of our hard drives and indefinitely retain them in
government storage seems too Orwellian . . . to be embraced as a Fourth Amendment rule.”).
209 Id. at 561. Agencies could adopt new procedures that allow a target to review the data ob-
tained from a body scan, but that would not assuage fears of scan data being later transferred and
mined for an illegitimate purpose.
210 See Robert Kirk Walker, Note, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 257, 285–86
(2012) (“If an individual no longer wants his personal data to be . . . stored by a data controller,
and if there is no legitimate reason for keeping it, the data should be removed . . . .” (quoting
Press Release, Viviane Reding, Vice President of the European Comm’n & E.U. Justice
Comm’r, The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for Modern
Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age (Jan. 24, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=SPEECH/12/26) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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citizens.211 If citizens believe that their body chemistry is being meticulously tracked,
they are not only less likely to be active in their daily lives, but they are also less likely
to be creative in the activities that they pursue.212 The First and Fourth Amendments are
sometimes thought of as protecting complementary rights—the right to speak publicly,
on one hand, and the right to speak privately, on the other—but courts have considered
the close interplay of those rights in several cases.213
The close relationship between privacy and free expression is discussed in Stanford
v. Texas,214 which characterizes the inspiration of the Fourth Amendment as stemming
from the historical “conflict between the Crown and the press.”215 In Stanford v. Texas,
the Supreme Court invalidated a warrant authorizing the search of a private home for
all books, records, and other materials relating to the Communist Party on the ground
that whether or not the warrant would have been sufficient in other contexts, it autho-
rized the searchers with the functional equivalent of a general warrant in contravention
of the Fourth Amendment.216 The Court’s opinion held that the Fourth Amendment re-
quires that warrants and reasonable searches be defined with “scrupulous exactitude,”
especially when targeted materials may implicate the First Amendment.217 The opinion
in Roaden v. Kentucky218 distinguished this requirement, stating, “A seizure reasonable
as to one type of material in one setting may be unreasonable in a different setting or
with respect to another kind of material.”219 Given the diversity of personal information
exposed by a search via PSPL, including information about the current hormone and
adrenaline levels of a target, molecular scanning will likely become useful in a variety
of areas of law enforcement, and the reasonableness of such scans will vary in different
circumstances. Where presumptively protected materials are the intended objects of a
search and seizure, “the warrant requirement should be administered to leave as little
as possible to the discretion or whim of the officer in the field.”220 These Supreme Court
211 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 763–65 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“[M]ust everyone live in fear that every word he speaks may be transmitted or recorded and
later repeated to the entire world? I can imagine nothing that has a more chilling effect on people
speaking their minds and expressing their views on important matters.”).
212 See Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729 (1961) (“[U]nrestricted power of search
and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling liberty of expression.”); Promote Creativity:
Let Customers Decide How To Use and Discuss Your Product, ACLU, http://www.dotrights.org
/business/primer/free-speech/promote-creativity (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
213 Most cases that discuss the Fourth Amendment as constructed with the First Amendment
involve laws that prohibit recording phone calls or other conduct without the subject of the
recording’s permission. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 1 (1972).
214 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
215 Id. at 482.
216 Id. at 485–86.
217 Id. at 485.
218 413 U.S. 496 (1973).
219 Id. at 501.
220 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978).
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holdings are consistent with and make urgent the adoption of limited and racially neu-
tral definitions for the chemical signatures that give rise to added suspicion or probable
cause for each situation in which a molecular scanner may be used.
Surveillance evidence will usually be admitted if it comports with the Fourth
Amendment alone; thus, the First Amendment argument is rarely raised in criminal
cases.221 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that constitutional violations may
arise from governmental action that creates a “chilling effect” but “falls short of a direct
prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment rights.”222 Still, most such claims
fail as a result of lack of standing caused by the inability to articulate an injury that is
more than remote and speculative. In ACLU v. NSA,223 the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held:
[T]o the extent the plaintiffs claim that they are prevented, re-
quired, compelled, or coerced in their actions, it is due not to any
direct and immediate order or regulation by the government, but to
circumstances stemming from the plaintiffs’ own subjective ap-
prehension that (1) their communications will be intercepted by
the NSA and (2) that interception will be detrimental to their over-
seas contacts. This is not a concrete, actual, and imminent injury
for purposes of establishing standing.224
It should not be underestimated, however, how revealing a scan by AIT, like the PSPL,
is relative to a scan by the technologies dealt with in previous cases. The unique detail
achieved by a PSPL scan and the gross amount of personal information derivable from
such a scan weigh in favor of reconsidering existing doctrine and establishing a Fourth
Amendment violation as constructed with the First Amendment in future cases. In the
end, firmly establishing a policy of not monitoring the chemical history of citizens’
bodies would encourage a more robust and expressive marketplace.225 At the very least,
legislators and law enforcement need to develop narrowly tailored definitions for what
chemical tags give rise to heightened scrutiny or added suspicion, thus limiting the de-
gree to which individual privacy is invaded.
221 See Gordon v. Warren Consol. Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 778, 781 n.3 (6th Cir. 1983)
(“Courts have recognized that physical surveillance consistent with Fourth Amendment protec-
tions in connection with a good faith law enforcement investigation does not violate First
Amendment rights, even though it may be directed at communicative or associative activities.”).
222 Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1052 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
223 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007).
224 Id. at 663–64 (citing Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) and United Presbyterian
Church v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1378–80 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
225 See Encourage Users to Speak Freely: Establish Policies that Promote Speech in Every
Form, ACLU, http://www.dotrights.org/business/primer/free-speech/encourage-speech (last
visited Oct. 21, 2013).
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B. The Drug War: No Minimum Threshold for Drug Possession
This Part will explore how the use of molecular scanners implicates Fourth
Amendment doctrine in the context of the Drug War. Unlike Part IV.A, this Part will
focus on nonadministrative searches that are performed in public and will examine
plain view doctrine and the need for minimum contraband possession thresholds.
1. Plain View Doctrine and Twenty-First Century Imaging
The Supreme Court first articulated the plain view doctrine in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire226:
What the “plain view” cases have in common is that the police of-
ficer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the
course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the
prior justification—whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against
the accused—and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the
extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the “plain view” doctrine may not be used to extend a gen-
eral exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges.227
In Horton v. California,228 the Supreme Court rejected the idea that evidence needs to
be “inadvertently” discovered under the plain view doctrine and held that so long as the
officer is engaged in lawful Fourth Amendment conduct at the time that the evidence
is located, “the legality of its seizure will not be effected by whether or not he hoped or
expected to find it.”229
In Arizona v. Hicks, the Supreme Court held that a standard less than probable
cause could not justify a seizure under the plain view doctrine.230 This is not a demand-
ing threshold to meet given the accuracy of molecular scanners, but the question still
remains whether the data acquired by a molecular scan is left in plain view and thus
subject to the plain view doctrine. In United States v. Bustos-Torres,231 the Eighth
226 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
227 Id. at 466.
228 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
229 WARRANTLESS SEARCH LAW DESKBOOK § 17:3 (citing Horton, 496 U.S. at 138).
230 480 U.S. 321, 327 (1987).
231 396 F.3d 935 (8th Cir. 2005).
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Circuit Court of Appeals held that an “officer conducting a pat-down search [must]
have probable cause to believe the item in plain touch is incriminating evidence . . . .
To give rise to probable cause the incriminating character of the object must be immedi-
ately identifiable . . . . [T]he object must be one ‘whose contour or mass makes its iden-
tity immediately apparent.’”232 Accordingly, by analogy from “plain touch” to “plain
view,” information regarding the subtle vibration and electromagnetic emissions of
molecules, which is only made apparent by the aid of an advanced scan technology,
cannot reasonably be construed as “immediately apparent” to the officer conducting the
search. Molecular scan data, as acquired with technology like the PSPL, then, should
not be made admissible under the plain view doctrine. If an individual cannot rely on
his skin to hide from plain view intimate details regarding body chemistry, and instead
must don a special scan-proof shielding to do so, then the “plainness” of the doctrine
will have lost all meaning.
2. Contraband Possession Thresholds and the Door to Dystopia
Foreign customs officials in nations such as England and Dubai have already begun
detaining international travelers in airports for possession of negligible quantities of
drugs, forecasting the “Orwellian future” that awaits the United States if minimum
thresholds for contraband possession are not established soon.233
There is no minimum quantity needed to establish criminal possession of a
drug under federal statute. Under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), which makes “it unlawful to
possess a controlled substance without a valid prescription or order from a practi-
tioner, it has been found that the quantity of the substance is not an element of simple
possession.”234 State courts are mixed as to whether a minimum quantity is needed
to establish criminal possession, but most states impose no such threshold:
232 Id. at 944–45 (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 376 (1993)).
233 Beth Hale, Briton Jailed for Four Years in Dubai After Customs Find Cannabis Weighing
Less Than a Grain of Sugar Under His Shoe, MAIL ONLINE (Feb. 8, 2008), http://www.dailymail
.co.uk/news/article-512815/Briton-jailed-years-Dubai-customs-cannabis-weighing-grain-sugar
-shoe.html (“Customs authorities are using highly sensitive new equipment to conduct extremely
thorough searches on travellers and if they find any amount—no matter how minute—it will be
enough to attract a mandatory four-year prison sentence . . . . We even have reports of the impris-
onment of a Swiss man for ‘possession’ of three poppy seeds on his clothing after he ate a bread
roll at Heathrow.” (citation omitted)).
234 25 AM. JUR. 2D Drugs and Controlled Substances § 160 (2004) (emphasis added) (citing
United States v. Smith, 34 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 1994)); see 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2006). But see
United States v. Sharp, 12 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he factor at issue (here the quantity
of crack cocaine possessed by the defendant) does not merely affect the length of the defendant’s
sentence, but determines whether he is guilty of a felony or a misdemeanor.”); United States v.
Puryear, 940 F.2d 602, 604 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Absent a jury finding as to the amount of cocaine,
the trial court may not decide of its own accord to enter a felony conviction and sentence, instead
of a misdemeanor conviction and sentence, by resolving the crucial element of the amount of
cocaine against the defendant.”).
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All states have statutory provisions regarding prohibited drugs, but
courts discussing the minimum quantity of a drug necessary to
support a conviction for its possession have reached disparate con-
clusions, even when construing substantially similar statutes. While
many courts have determined that the possession of any quantity
of a drug is sufficient to support a conviction, other courts . . .
have held that the possession of less than a usable amount is
not prohibited.235
Given the lack of federal threshold quantities for contraband possession, it is important
that a scan via technology like the PSPL constitutes a search, thus triggering Fourth
Amendment protections. All that the government must show to prove that an arrest by
police was justified is that a reasonable person would have believed that the suspect had
committed or was committing an offense given the totality of the facts and circum-
stances at the time of arrest.236 This is a low standard given the high resolution and reli-
ability of the PSPL and the multiplicity of possible possession offenses. The search
leading to the incriminating evidence must be proper, however, as fruits of an unlawful
search cannot provide probable cause for an arrest.237 If molecular scanning is justified
either as not a search or as falling under the plain view doctrine, then any microscopic
amount of contraband carried by a person’s shoes, hair, car tires, or otherwise will give
cause to police to arrest the suspect and seize all of the suspect’s tainted property. The
inevitability of excessive detainments and arrests for harmless or unusable quantities
of contraband suggests that minimum thresholds for contraband possession need to be
firmly established at the federal and state levels as soon as possible.238
CONCLUSION
In summary, we have explored the definition of “privacy,” the value of privacy,
and the right to privacy historically.239 We have also examined the superior capabilities
of molecular scanners relative to traditional scanning technologies, and discussed how
235 Minimum Quantity of Drug Required to Support Claim that Defendant is Guilty of
Criminal “Possession” of Drug Under State Law, 4 A.L.R. 5TH 1 (1992) (emphasis added).
236 United States v. McCarty, 648 F.3d 820, 839 (9th Cir. 2011).
237 Id.
238 Threshold quantities for contraband possession are commonly assessed for the purpose of
determining minimum and maximum sentences, but negligible or unusable amounts of contra-
band still trigger criminal liability in most cases. Compare United States v. Richards, 87 F.3d
1152, 1158 (10th Cir. 1996) (emphasizing that the detectable amount of drugs, rather than the
usable, marketable, or consumable amount of drugs, determines sentencing), with United States
v. Stewart, 361 F.3d 373, 382 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[O]nly usable or consumable mixtures or sub-
stances can be used in determining drug quantity . . . .”).
239 See supra Parts I and II.
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molecular scanning in the context of the War on Terror and the Drug War implicates
certain Fourth Amendment doctrines.240 Specifically, we determined that the use of a
molecular scanner by law enforcement to obtain information on a target constitutes a
“search” under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, that such a search is reasonable
only if narrowly tailored, that the storing of molecular scan data is arguably unreason-
able, that molecular scanning arguably violates the Fourth Amendment as constructed
with the First Amendment, and that an absence of contraband possession thresholds
could lead to privacy abuses.241 These conclusions suggest that it would be prudent to
proactively clarify Fourth Amendment doctrine in favor of greater privacy protection
before the proliferation of molecular scanning devices and prudent to adopt minimum
quantity thresholds for contraband substances.
It may be impossible to fully anticipate the consequences of an emerging tech-
nology like molecular scanners. How a new technology will be practically used, and
abused, is something that the law can usually only discover in hindsight. When a new
technology emerges to obviously threaten a fundamental right, such as the right of
privacy, scholars and the public must actively dialogue about the value of that right and
remain vigilant of court holdings that threaten to undermine constitutional protection
for that right. Hopefully the attention that has recently been paid by the Supreme Court
to advanced surveillance techniques will inspire an enthusiastic generation of consti-
tutional scholarship about responsible strategies for preserving individual privacy amid
the constantly evolving landscape of security technologies.
240 See supra Parts III and IV.
241 See supra Part IV.
